
The resonance of the mini-war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 was indeed strong, but it has become clear that ‘shook the world’ (the famous metaphor used by John Reed to characterize the October 1917 revolution in Russia) is an overstatement, if not wishful thinking. The dust from the tanks at the outskirts of Tbilisi has settled, and Russia’s relations with the EU and NATO have improved to ‘business-better-than-usual’. It is high time to think about the lessons from that dramatic breakdown of European security order, and the author, who worked hard on developing this order as both ‘thinker’ and ‘practitioner’ (p. 8), is uniquely qualified to ‘tell the story of why and how the war in Georgia happened’ (p. 14). However, the aim of this book is primarily to prove that the US policy of alliance-building with Georgia was both noble and rational. Asmus insists that ‘there is no evidence that Saakashvili was given a green light or encouragement from the United States to act militarily’ (p. 47), forgetting to mention joint military exercises called ‘Immediate Response’. The fact that the bulk of Georgia’s state budget consisted – and still does – of direct aid from the USA is not found worth mentioning. The fast-moving narrative never deviates from the proposition that a better combination of ‘old-fashioned diplomacy and deterrence’, including deployment of ‘authentic’ peacekeeping forces on the ground, could have prevented the war – and is the only way to avoid another one (p. 222). That such collective Western effort was not feasible in 2008 and is completely out of the question now is irrelevant in this perspective.

Pavel Bavev


‘How has war, an activity traditionally dominated by institutions extolling the virtues of hierarchical command and submission to orders, come to be understood essentially in terms of decentralized networks of combatants connected together by horizontal information links?’ (p. 2). This question directs Bousquet’s inquiry into the changing nature of warfare over the past three centuries. Doing so, he proposes four metaphors and four warfare models derived from these metaphors, as well as an example of warfare governed by each model. The first metaphor is the clock, illustrating a mechanistic model of warfare, exemplified by Frederick the Great’s army – characterized by strict discipline, unconditional obedience, and prompt execution of orders. The second metaphor is the engine, explaining the thermodynamic model of warfare, exemplified in Clausewitz’s writings. The third metaphor is the computer, explaining the model of cybernetic warfare; the Vietnam War is used as an example of the failure of this type of warfare. The final metaphor is the network, which illustrates what the author calls chaoplexic warfare – a word he coins to merge the emerging sciences of chaos and complexity theory. The arguments are illuminating but not compelling. Almost half the book is devoted to explanation and justification of the metaphors. As such, the book appears to be a defense of the four models, rather than an attempt to explain and enlighten the reader regarding the changing nature of warfare. The book could potentially have been effective at answering the question it sets out to answer. Unfortunately it only partially succeeds, owing to an overemphasis on defending its own metaphors and the author’s sometimes overly complex language.

Clark Capshaw


This edited volume addresses the inter-relationships between conflict and holy places in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. As we all know, this conflict-ridden region is full of places of intense symbolic, religious, cultural and holy significance not only to Israelis and Palestinians, but to different people around the globe. While many previous studies have explored to what extent these places may be the cause of conflict, few studies have systematically explored the conflict dynamics that occur at them. Accordingly, this volume is much needed. The book contains 14 chapters written by different scholars. Each chapter deals with different aspects of the overall theme, ranging from the legal regulations that are applied to these places; analysis of the different categorizations of holy places in the region; and historical overviews of the conflict dynamics on several specific places, such as the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron, the Nachmanides’ Cave in Jerusalem and the Shihab al Din Mosque in Nazareth. The book thus offers a variety of analytical approaches to the interface between conflict and
holy place presented in a sober and well-arranged way. At the same time, the fact that the book embraces such a wide range of approaches and empirical examples leaves the reader with a somewhat uneasy feeling of being presented with a lot of data lacking detail and in-depth analysis. Merely scratching the surface of such crucial issues, the book is somewhat unsatisfying. That being said, its focus is much needed and we can only hope that scholars will see the book as an encouragement for future research.


Why is it that the Western powers mostly won their colonial wars in the 19th and the first half of the 20th century, yet tended to lose their asymmetric wars since then? Can Western armies win wars of the Iraq and Afghanistan kind? These questions are discussed in this tiny, yet perceptive volume. In a chapter on the genealogy of war, Chaliand proposes an innovative typology: ritual warfare; war for limited aims; war of conquest; mass war (total war); and war without bases (‘sans quartiers’). The latter, which is characterized by terrorist or guerrilla tactics, is in no way new. Chaliand goes through the long history of guerrilla tactics and analyzes the colonial wars, where Europe’s adversaries on average lost 50 lives for each European. The chapter on colonial wars does not stop at the Second World War, but includes Mao Zedong’s theories, the wars of decolonization, and the US war in Vietnam. In his final chapter, ‘The transformation of irregular warfare’, Chaliand seeks answers to his questions, finding them in the changed demographic balance and the increased importance of public opinion, both in the countries where the wars are fought and in the rich, industrialized countries. Public opinion in Europe and North America has drastically reduced its tolerance for losing own lives and for inflicting massive death on others. Irregular warfare today is heavily psychological and is fought globally, not on any delimited battlefield. Only through strategies aiming to impact the mentality of the local population can Westerners avoid losing their wars. I highly recommend this book, perhaps as a companion to Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2005).


The People’s Republic of China has not been highly prone to using force in its territorial disputes. Among the 23 territorial disputes it has participated in on land and at sea, it has pursued compromise and offered concessions in 17. The two main periods of conflict resolution, with a number of border agreements, were the early 1960s and the early 1990s. This demonstrates a pattern: while China has normally opted for a delaying strategy and has refrained from either using force or entering into agreements when its power has been rising, it has been prone to seeking negotiated agreements in situations when its internal stability was at risk. The Tibetan uprising of 1959 and the disastrous Great Leap Forward prompted the first big effort to resolve border disputes. Tiananmen 1989 and the demise of the Soviet Union led to the second. In each of these situations, Beijing feared that external powers would utilize and exacerbate its internal problems and sought to prevent this by resolving territorial disputes. China has used force in six of its territorial disputes (India 1962, Taiwan 1954, 1958, 1995–96, the Soviet Union 1969, Vietnam 1979–89, the Paracels 1974, the Spratlys 1988). In each case this aimed to rectify what Beijing saw as a weakening of its local position in relation to others (‘claim strength’). These are just some of the findings in this outstanding study, a model of solid, theoretically informed, innovative scholarship. With help from a number of newly drawn excellent maps, it first goes through all of China’s frontier disputes, then its ‘homeland disputes’ (Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan), and finally its offshore disputes.


Recognizing that the limited availability of documentation on sexual violence constantly poses a challenge to academic analysis, Harrington’s pursuit of tracing politicization of sexual violence from the abolition of slavery in the USA to sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers is impressive. Her departing question is still valid: Why was the 1990s the right time for rape to become an international security question? Her use of a Foucaultian framework of ‘governmentality’ to analyse the politicization of sexual violence is apt, since much of this has been a process led by civil society. It is the exponential increase in the documentation, due to the proliferation of civil society activities in the conflict-ridden countries since the late 1980s, that compelled the international community to recognize it as a human security threat. Through analysis of currently existing literature on sexual violence, Harrington raises important points such as the reluctance of military establishments to actively address sexual violence. However, the study of sexual violence in armed conflicts is still in its consolidating period as an academic field, and scholars and policymakers alike have not yet grasped the complete extent of sexual violence in armed conflicts as the evidence remains largely anecdotal. We have also seen an increasing number of studies on the motivation of perpetrators to complement the current victim-centric understanding of sexual violence. Harrington’s conclusion, that the policy towards sexual violence continues to emphasize the moral conduct of women, seems hasty.
Nevertheless, Harrington offers analysis of existing academic discourse on sexual violence and comprehensive knowledge of the history and politicization of sexual violence which is highly useful for both practitioners and academics.

Suk Chun


Kimberly Kagan has written a thoroughly researched, richly detailed account of the 2007 troop surge in Iraq and its aftermath. The Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine was developed by General David Petraeus during his command of the Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from 2005 to 2006. Kagan’s book represents both a confirmation of that doctrine and a counterpoint to recent pessimistic accounts of the progress in Iraq. What Kagan’s book also offers is greater insight into the strategic visions of the various insurgent factions in Iraq, whether they are al Qaeda-affiliated movements, indigenous factions, or groups tied to Iran. Kagan illuminates how the seemingly chaotic violence perpetrated by these factions makes strategic sense when viewed from the perspective of each group. What is also clear is that the counterinsurgency strategy is working successfully in prising the population and leaders away from such movements. In the author’s words, ‘The Coalition operations of 2007 and 2008 are proof that a well-designed military campaign executed with a comprehensive political and economic effort can defeat enemy groups and bring violence under control’ (p. xiv). But Kagan is no Pollyanna; she admits that the USA should have anticipated and prepared for the factional fighting that broke out after Saddam’s fall. She also points out that the excessive focus of the military leaders on *non-kinetic* counterinsurgency operations (development assistance, education, intelligence gathering) during the initial period (2003–2006) made the transition to a balance of *kinetic* (i.e. combat) and *non-kinetic* operations during the 2007 surge more difficult. Perhaps because of a printing error, the table of contents omits Chapter 8, ‘Iran’s Proxy War in Iraq’, arguably the book’s best chapter.

Clark Capshaw


Although based on extensive research, this account of President Richard M Nixon’s February 1972 visit to China reads like a novel. It takes us through all the planning, spying, probing and banqueting, with frequent excursions into past history. The profiles of Mao Zedong, Henry Kissinger, Zhou Enlai and Nixon are trenchant. The book deserves its status as a bestseller. Credit is also due to Macmillan for having seen something in Nixon that most have ignored, owing to a general contempt for the man. Nixon’s reconciliation with communist China was not just a smart move to exploit the Sino-Soviet rivalry. Nixon saw himself as a visionary peacemaker. He was on a ‘journey for peace, peace not just for our generation but for future generations’. His ‘great idea’ was to lead the United States to build permanent peace in the world. This was not pure rhetoric, says Macmillan. He ‘longed to be good’. Nixon’s visions were written into a draft Sino-American communiqué, but when Mao was shown it, he dismissed it as empty talk: ‘We have to emphasize revolution’, he said to Zhou Enlai. This was the background for the strange wording in the Shanghai communiqué of 28 February 1972, where Mao and Nixon expressed opposite worldviews: ‘The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution – this has become the irresistible trend of history … The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world require efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The United States will work for a just and secure peace.’

Stein Tønnesen


It has become rather common to discursively analyze aspects of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. It has also become somewhat common to analyze the post-Oslo period as one in which occupational practices have remained, in essence, if not in detail, the same as during the pre-Oslo period. What is uncommon, and which McMahon does in great detail, is to combine these two approaches. Postulating that the Oslo treaty did not represent a turning point in Palestinian–Israeli relations, Sean McMahon uses a discursive analysis to show how the same assertions and silences prevailed in political and academic discourses on both sides of the Oslo timeline. This is done by grouping ‘rules of formation’ and ‘systematic silences’, and showing how these are largely the same in the pre- and post-Oslo periods. This is thoroughly done and logically presented, strongly making the point that as long as the discourse doesn’t change, the main issues of the conflict are not adequately addressed, and just peace cannot be obtained. As such, Sean McMahon argues that the Oslo process does not represent a turning point at all. The strength of the book is its meticulous nature, but inherent in this is also its weakness. By setting too strict demands on what is needed in order to be characterized as counter-hegemonic, Sean McMahon ends up grouping too large a spectrum of authors into the category of persistent discourse. This rigidity also makes it seem as if the conflict cannot be about both real injustice (systematic silences) and psychological barriers (rules of formation), but rather either/or. Despite these weaknesses, the book stands as an important and original contribution to the Israel–Palestine literature.

Jørgen Jensehaugen

The Sino-Vietnamese border war from 17 February to 15 March 1979 was the last of East Asia’s wars with a very high number of battle-deaths: 50–60,000. O’Dowd’s analysis of China’s ‘teach a lesson’ campaign, based on Chinese and Vietnamese military unit histories, shows why it was so deadly. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) used ‘human wave’ frontal assault tactics against fortified Vietnamese hills instead of waiting to attack until the defensive positions had been destroyed by precise artillery. Furthermore, the belligerents took few prisoners. Most of those who were not killed in battle seem to have been killed after being captured. O’Dowd castigates the PLA for its ill-conceived strategy, which did not realize China’s goal of forcing Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia. Although the Chinese enjoyed a four or five fold numerical advantage, they were unable to break through the Vietnamese lines of defence and threaten Hanoi. O’Dowd blames this failure on Maoist doctrine and its emphasis on political work to the detriment of military skills. This seems far-fetched. Vietnam’s performance shows how it is possible to combine political work and military accomplishment. China’s failure had several reasons: the Vietnamese were battle-trained, while few of the PLA officers had seen combat previously. The Vietnamese knew the mountainous terrain and China wrongly betted on the psychological effects of a rapid, massive offensive. Despite this, O’Dowd deserves praise not only for his detailed analysis of the ill-fated Chinese offensive, but also for situating the border campaign within the larger framework of the Third Indochina War, 1978–89. Artillery exchanges would continue on the Sino-Vietnamese border, at intervals, until 1988.

Stein Tønnesson


The title of this thoughtful and pedantically researched book deliberately echoes Sun Tsu’s classics, as the author maintains that scientific methods of preparing for combat, imprecise as they are, are an ‘essential complement’ to the art of war (p. 2). This is essentially a textbook, dealing primarily with the US security agenda and pursuing the goal ‘to reduce sloppiness’ (p. 243). It is not difficult to see O’Hanlon’s certitude that in the past decade there was way too much sloppiness in financing and developing US military might. The four chapters of the book deal with defense budgeting and resource allocation; modeling combat and sizing forces; logistics; and technical issues in defense analysis. The first is probably most useful for a layperson, who would still need to dig deep into detail, because O’Hanlon warns that quick judgments about over/underspending based on economic, comparative or strategic perspectives are ‘analytically suspect’, and the only way to go is to look ‘more carefully at how defense dollars are spent’ (p. 9).

One of the great many insights in this beautifully designed volume is that the ‘popular hypothesis’ about a revolution in military affairs, which changes radically all forms of warfare and downplays the role of ground power, led Donald Rumsfeld to the ill-conceived decision of deploying only a small invasion force to Iraq in 2003 (p. 171). O’Hanlon warns that ‘much of the political rhetoric surrounding the state of the current American military is overblown’ (p. 244), but it is hard to expect that his positivist approach would blossom in the ideologically charged atmosphere of hopefully polarized Washington.

Pavel Baev


This next and concise book is one of those peculiar projects that were started around 2007 with one set of aims, and completed by late 2009 with a very different perspective. Pirani apparently wanted to show that Putin’s ‘era of stability’ actually saw a lot of changes and was not that stable, but ended up arguing that changes during Medvedev’s presidency did not alter the stable pattern and the country remained ‘Putin’s Russia’. It is natural to expect the author, from the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, to give keen attention to oil-and-gas matters. The book indeed examines the ‘boom-to-bust’ trajectory competently, but without going into too much detail. The conflicts with international oil companies are succinctly evaluated and the gist of the Yukos affair is given, but the author observes caustically that as Mikhail Khodorkovsky was transforming himself into ‘anti-authoritarian hero’, Western banks were ‘pouring money into Russia with indecent haste’ (p. 74). The point that the ‘gas wars’ with Ukraine were driven by capitalist logic rather than by Moscow’s desire to brandish the ‘energy weapon’ is particularly well made (p. 86). What a reader might not expect is an elaboration of the ‘people’ part of the story – from demography and social inequality to human rights NGOs and grassroots movements. Monitoring the predatory behaviour of business and political elites, Pirani argues that change in Russia would only come when mass-based social movements take politics out of their hands. He has no illusions concerning ‘embryonic and mostly local’ NGOs, but points out that the government, for all its ‘dictatorial reputation’, has ‘consistently displayed extreme nervousness in the face of social movement’ (pp. 196–197).

Pavel Baev

This volume enhances existing literature on the Chechen conflicts as it is one of the few works that clearly argues the Chechen position. There is much greater emphasis on Chechen culture, Chechen society and how cultural differences feed into separatist aspirations than in other books on the subject. It provides a detailed account of recent Chechen history and is written in a vivid manner, infusing the reader with the writer’s enthusiasm for the cultures and peoples of the North Caucasus. A detailed analysis of the similarities and differences between the separatists and the terrorists provides the reader with greater insight into Chechen politics. This well articulated work also puts the Chechen War within the greater context of the insurgency in the North Caucasus. The emphasis on the difference of cultural norms (Russian and Chechens) and how these impact the fighting is particularly interesting. Given the emphasis on the Chechen perspectives, the reader will be exposed to some new perspectives on the Chechen conflicts in particular and the North Caucasus in general. This work provides some key insights as to why the Republic of Chechnya was viewed as a greater threat than other separatist territories in the nascent Russian Federation. The discussion on negotiations could have been strengthened by a discussion of international law and differences in negotiation styles. The reader’s appreciation of the destructiveness of the conflict is weakened by the lack of in-depth discussion of the tactics used by the Chechens in both wars. It is somewhat disappointing that this work does not include any ways forward or resolution options. A detailed table of contents compensates for the lack of an index.

Renée Gendron


When Professor Ralph B Smith, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, died in 2000, he left behind a number of article manuscripts. The late Judy Stowe of the BBC and Beryl Williams of the University of Sussex deserve praise for having selected 19 of Smith’s published and unpublished articles for these two volumes. Smith started out as a comparative historian, then delved into the political history of mainly southern Vietnam. This is reflected in the book on pre-communist Indochina. The second book contains articles on the history of the Indochinese Communist Party, the Vietnamese revolution, the Vietnam War and relations between the Vietnamese, Chinese and Cambodian communists. These are two essential books for any library. This year, by the way, will also see the completion of Smith’s monumental International History of the Vietnam War, the first three volumes of which were published by Macmillan in 1983, 1985 and 1991, covering the years 1955–66 and based on systematic compilation of massive amounts of publicly available sources. Smith’s student Ang Chen Guan has now written a fourth volume taking us from 1966 to 1975. It is scheduled to be published in October 2010, and respects Smith’s principle of combining a tight chronology with simultaneous analysis of decisions on both sides of the war. In addition, Ang Chen Guan uses archival material. Ralph Smith would have been immensely pleased.

Stein Tonnessen


Rachel Stohl has written another accessible book on arms trade and arms proliferation targeted for a non-expert audience. This time, she and Suzette Grillot cover the international conventional arms trade pattern in a comprehensive way, describing and explaining the inner workings of the legal as well as the illicit conventional arms markets. As perhaps can be expected, the chapters dealing with the licit (state sanctioned) trade are the strongest parts of the book. The authors are very knowledgeable and make their case clearly and strongly through a combination of systematic analysis and illustrative anecdotes. They cover the history of arms production and the development of international arms markets, how the politics of the arms trade relates to international politics more generally, and how it relates to domestic and international economic factors. Their account is rather sweeping in style, providing broad generalizations complemented with corroborating historical facts and the occasional insider’s account from individuals involved in the deals in question. A very interesting element of these accounts is how the authors are able to demonstrate the grey zones between the licit and the illicit markets. Unfortunately, the chapters dealing with the illicit markets are significantly weaker as they are marred by the lack of empirical foundations. This is a problem most researchers encounter when attempting to address these clandestine activities, and they usually attempt to solve it through anecdotal evidence and the examples of one or two individual arms traffickers. Unfortunately, the authors of this book choose to grant these anecdotes significant space instead of expanding on the very insightful perspectives they provide on how these illicitly trafficked weapons find their way into the black market in the first place.

Hilde Wallacher


IR has become increasingly reflexive recently. Not only have interpretative epistemologies been introduced into the field. The discipline’s own foundational myths, its intellectual premises and purposes, its transnational scholarly structuring and its national and regional manifestations have now also become
central objects of inquiry. This volume marks the latest contribution to this research agenda. Collecting essays on 16 different countries and regions from all continents of the world, the book characterizes and differentiates a spectacular multitude of 'geocultural epistemologies'. Each chapter documents in detail the evolving sociology of these 'epistemologies': How are IR communities informed by local and international political and scholarly traditions? How are they affected by bureaucratic measures and material conditions? In what national and global academic debates do they engage? With the 16 contributions and its broader conceptual introduction and conclusion, the volume draws a new and diverse picture of the evolution and state of the global discipline. In so doing, it powerfully challenges the traditional portrayal of IR as a sequence of intellectual 'great debates' taking place almost exclusively at US universities. Yet, the volume does not fail to address the preponderance of US scholarship in global IR as well. Readers will find it striking to see how strongly national IR communities are influenced by the work of US academics, their theoretical contributions in particular, and they will be impressed to learn how pronouncedly self-referential US IR is, notwithstanding its ambition for universal applicability. The volume is a reference work for those interested in the diverse underpinnings and manifestations of global IR. Successfully recasting the discipline's self-representation, it opens up the challenging debate of how pluralistic an international discipline should be.

Jonas Hagmann


The book develops a two-pronged theory, focused on norms and foreign policies, of how nationalism can cause conflict between neighbouring states. Woodwell argues that in cases where a shared ethnic group constitutes a majority in at least one of two states in a dyad, a security dilemma ensues that may give the destabilizing norm of self-determination (for the 'diaspora' kin group in the neighbouring state) greater weight than the stabilizing international norm of territorial integrity. In such situations, a number of domestic factors in the 'homeland state' (in which the shared ethnic group forms the majority) may trigger conflict, including military influence on foreign policy, feasibility of military action, and the nature of the executive. Woodwell develops the two-pronged 'normative-demographic' and domestic foreign policy theory in the first part of the book and tests it using the Correlates of War dataset with data on ethnic groups from the Minorities at Risk dataset and other sources. The second part of the book contains a number of qualitative case studies, which focus on the dynamics of irredentist-type situations in which the majority ethnic group in one state forms a minority in a neighbouring state. There are some unfortunate typos and errors in the book, such as negative signs on the coefficients for half of the variables in one table (5.2) when they should be positive. This weakens the overall impression. If you are looking for a general discussion of nationalism in international relations, this is not it. All in all, however, this is a welcome attempt to consider the effects of dispersed nations on inter-state conflicts and to systematically incorporate nationalism into the study of international relations.

Paul T Levin

Authors of Book Notes in this issue:

Pavel Baev – PRIO
Clark Capshaw – University of Phoenix
Suk Chun – PRIO
Renée Gendron – Canadian International Institute of Applied Negotiation
Jonas Hagmann – ETH Zurich
Jørgen Jensehaugen – PRIO
Paul T Levin – Stockholm University
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