

There is no footnote. I believe he is referring to the many border crossers; but these are not 500 million different individuals or persons, but mostly the same people making multiple crossings. And the figure of 500 million crossings is about twice the number I have seen in various government publications.

Hing discusses many topics, such as the Patriot Act and deportation. He makes many good points about reform and increased immigration, but he never tells us about the cost of change. It is also curious that he favours a temporary worker programme. Is George W. Bush's control of the Department of Labor and the National Labor Relations Board reassuring about protecting temporary workers? Will this proposal simply be a way for employers to obtain cheap labour? The experience of the Bracero programme is not reassuring; it became a way for growers to have a ready supply of low-cost labour. Even some of the small temporary work programmes, such as the H-1 and H-2, are not always considerate of the workers. What if 250,000 temporary workers are permitted each year, but there are twice that number wanting to come? Will the extra workers simply migrate as undocumented labourers as they did between the 1940s until Operation *Wetback* in 1954?

In summary, Hing attacks current immigration policy and tries to make a case for major reform. Unfortunately, the lack of historical perspective, harsh language, and errors make the case less convincing that he wants it to be.

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MICHAEL MANDELBAUM. *The Case for Goliath: How America Acts as the World's Government in the 21st Century*. New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2005. Pp. xxii, 283. \$26.00 (US).

ALTHOUGH SERIOUSLY FLAWED on three accounts, this book will remain an important work of reference. The first flaw is in the title. It is surprising that someone with sympathy for the US global role would choose Goliath as a metaphor; the only similarity is in military might. The Philistine giant measured over nine feet tall and was wearing full armour when mocking and challenging the Israelites to fight, but the fact that he allowed himself to be incapacitated by a single shot from David's sling shows that he was seriously deficient in brainpower. US military power is as awesome as Goliath's, but the United States is not short on brain power, and cannot be destroyed by a single strike. Michael Mandelbaum's title would seem to indicate that the United States is heading for disaster, but there is little basis for this in his text, although it does end by predicting that the rest of the world will miss US power when eventually it's gone. It cannot have been Mandelbaum's intention to set Osama bin Laden in the role of David, although this follows from the logic of the Goliath metaphor.

The second flaw is Mandelbaum's pretence that the United States already serves as the world's government. His analysis shows that US influence in global decision-making and its power of global enforcement fall far short of the power any sovereign government exerts on its territory (with the exception of 'failed states'). Mandelbaum's flawed pretence leads to a third flaw: he underestimates the importance of the United Nations: 'Lacking the power to implement its decisions, the UN is not, and has no prospect of becoming, a world government,' he claims (p. 143). This misrepresents the role of decisions in the security council, which are not meant to be implemented primarily by the UN secretary-general or his organization, but by the member states. When the security council reaches a decision, its members do normally have the power to implement it: the key to global governance is for the United States and the other security council members to reach agreement. For a more positive and reasonable assessment of the UN's importance, see P. Kennedy, *The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present, and Future of the United Nations* (2006).

With such flaws, why will Mandelbaum's book remain important? Because the world is likely to move in the direction of more global governance, unless human civilization is destroyed in a natural disaster or a nuclear war. With the rapid global integration of the last two decades, drawing such regional powers as China, India, Russia, Indonesia, South Africa, and Brazil into a global web of commerce and communication together with the United States, Japan, and the European Union, it seems unlikely that the globe will be divided into self-contained regional blocks, although regional organizations will have a role to play as precursors or driving forces in global institutional integration. We are also unlikely to see any lasting political fragmentation or 'multi-polarity', since this would not only hamper our ability to solve global problems, but also probably lead to an upsurge of local and regional wars, which in turn might produce a violent form of global state-building. Most state-building processes in the past have to a great extent been driven by war; indeed, the world's political history in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries may be conceived as a process of global state-building, with wars playing a central role both for failures and successes. The European colonial expansion did not just produce self-contained empires, but brought attempts to build federal institutions with a global reach that could serve as building blocks for a global order. With the demise of Europe in the two world wars, and the US and Soviet insistence that the core institutional unit in the global political order must be the sovereign nation state, colonial federalism faded out and gave way to a rivalry between two projects of global integration, one capitalist and one socialist, with the UN serving as a shared institutional arena for the two main rival powers and their allies, as well as a growing number of contested nations in the 'third world'. With the Sino-Soviet split and the later break-up of the Soviet Union came a process of rapid economic, technological, and communicational globalization, with East Asians playing an increasingly important role, also in the major institu-

tions of global governance. Even China not only tolerated, but actively wanted the United States to play a globally stabilizing role.

This is where Mandelbaum's analysis is at its best. He succinctly describes the key security role of the United States in preventing nuclear non-proliferation, forging alliances to fight and prevent terrorism, and undertaking humanitarian interventions. He provides a superb analysis of the US role in upholding a global economy through its support of the Bretton Woods institutions, its efforts to secure the free flow of oil and other sources of energy, its free trade policies, the role of the US dollar as the world's currency of last resort, the dominant and highly attractive role of the US equity market, and the key function of US consumption in enhancing global economic growth and productivity. The degree to which the United States has contributed to enhancing economic growth in other parts of the world, notably Europe and East Asia, is indeed remarkable. Mandelbaum's chapters on international security and the global economy should be required reading. The sub-chapter on oil on pages 94-115 is outstanding for its ability to condense and combine global economic and political trends with relation to the world's most strategic commodity. His conclusion merits quotation: 'Preventing global warming by leading the transition from an energy system relying heavily on oil to one making extensive use of other sources of energy is an immense, long-term task that involves replacing the very foundations of the international economy. It is a task for which a major American role is necessary, not least in supporting the expensive research and development necessary to find substitutes for fossil fuels – another way in which the United States would be performing a service for the entire international system similar to one that governments routinely carry out for the societies they govern' (pp. 114-15).

This, of course, is how it *should be*, perhaps also how it *will be* if the United States realizes not only the magnitude of the threat from climate change, but also the potential that the struggle against global warming may have for creating new and more responsible forms of global governance. Mandelbaum has to concede that, 'at the outset of the twenty-first century, the United States did not seem inclined to assume this responsibility' (p. 115). He also admits that the United States has so far failed in its attempts to build functioning states in the areas where it has intervened. Thus, he undermines his contention that the United States already functions as the global government.

Mandelbaum's chapter on international legitimacy is less convincing than the two previous ones. It notes the widespread resentment and criticism of the United States in other parts of the world, particularly an effect of the war in Iraq. Mandelbaum discusses US leadership and the costs of the US global role, but fails to adequately address the question of accountability. If the United States shall function as a world government, then it is problematic that the leaders in the White House and on Capitol Hill are accountable only to US citizens. Since we may assume that US citizenship will not be opened to all of humanity, the only way to

overcome the accountability problem is for the United States to seek legitimacy through the United Nations, or through an alternative global organization such as the G8 or an enlarged version thereof. Mandelbaum realizes that the United States does not have sufficient legitimacy to serve as a world government, and also notices the three deficits spelled out by Niall Ferguson in *Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire* (2004): the manpower deficit (mainly troops); the fiscal deficit (owing to medicare and social insurance obligations); and the attention deficit, which is so apparent now in the US public's growing unwillingness to let George W. Bush pursue the war in Iraq. Indeed, Mandelbaum ends his book by claiming, as does Ferguson, that the future of the US role as a world government will depend on 'the willingness of the American public to support it' (p. 225).

In the second half of the 1990s, the United States was in a unique position to attract support for much of its global role. It benefited from its geographical location at a safe distance from the Eurasian continent, its anti-imperialist legacy, its emphasis on basic rights and freedoms, and its democratic form of government, all of which reduced the natural inclination of other powers to see US pre-eminence as a threat to themselves. This favourable position was further enhanced by the Asian economic backlash in 1997-8 and by the successful US interventions in the Balkans. Then, however, the United States missed its opportunity to seize the momentum, because of its negative attitude to the United Nations, its unwillingness to engage in processes of global legislation and institution-building, and a growing sentiment that the United States should use hard power to enforce political change in other parts of the world. The United States was unable to build a greater and more legitimate global role for itself because it refused to accept treaties and conventions that would be binding on itself. By underestimating the importance of global legitimacy and resisting attempts to create new international law, the United States undermined its role in building global governance. At present, however, when the US public seems to recognize the threat from global warming and to admit the general failure of the Bush administration, there could be scope for a new beginning, a new proactive US role in building global governance within a framework of multilateral co-operation (See Z. Brzezinski, *Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower* [2007]). Anyone wanting to assess this possibility may benefit greatly from reading the lucid parts of Mandelbaum's analysis of the US global role.

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KATHY BOWREY, *Law and Internet Cultures*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Pp. x, 241. \$21.99 (US), paper.

MIX POST-MODERNISM (which views reality as a kaleidoscope of symbolic interactions), critical legal studies (which emphasizes how political, economic, and