

decisions leading to the Pacific War, and a review of the course of the war, emphasizing military operations in Southeast Asia, from Pearl Harbor to Japan's surrender. The fourth chapter, drawing on Akira Iriye's analysis of Japanese wartime diplomacy (*Power and Culture: The Japanese American War, 1931–1945* [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981]) discusses the overall framework of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The fifth explores Japanese administration and its control techniques, followed by a chapter on the economic management of the occupied territories. The final chapter, although entitled "Memory and Legacy," is concerned primarily with documenting the brutality of Japanese rule.

These last three chapters delve into the practice of Japanese occupation and are clearly the most useful for readers interested in developments in Southeast Asia. Tarling underscores the differences in Japanese aims as well as approaches in each country or colony. The exploitation of Islam in Malaya and the Dutch East Indies is particularly intriguing. He also examines the varied responses of local elites, with special attention to the ambiguous motivations for "collaborating" with the Japanese. For readers acquainted with the general history of modern Japan and the diplomatic and military histories of World War II in Asia, however, a rather large part of the book retraces familiar ground. The author endeavors to pitch the narrative in the first three chapters toward Southeast Asia, but those looking for a focused treatment of the Japanese occupation of this region may find the space devoted to background coverage more than necessary.

Tarling takes on a very difficult task in constructing a narrative with a multiplicity of actors. It is clearly impossible to give equal voice to all of them in a single book. He does touch upon the European colonialist perspective and provides significant treatment of resistance and collaboration on the part of Southeast Asian elites, but as evidenced by the fact that he begins his narrative with an account of Meiji imperialism, the principal actors in his story are the Japanese conquerors. Tarling seeks to describe and explain the behavior of the Japanese state and its agencies in this region. To the extent that he emphasizes the Japanese vantage point, however, the absence of Japanese-language secondary literature in his synthesis becomes a significant limitation. Although he makes excellent use of existing English-language scholarship, recent monographs in English that delve into Japanese policy making and activity on the ground are relatively few, and this constraint unavoidably narrows the range of sources informing his account.

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Occupation and Revolution: China and the Vietnamese August Revolution of 1945.
By PETER WORTHING. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University
of California, Berkeley, 2001. 202pp. \$15.00 (paper).

The Potsdam conference in July 1945 decided to split Indochina into two theatres of war, with the area north of the sixteenth parallel falling within Jiang Jieshi's China Theatre, and the south coming under Admiral Mountbatten's South-East Asia Command. When Japan surrendered on August 15, President Truman decided to keep up the division of Indochina also for the purpose of receiving the surrender and arranging for the repatriation of Japanese troops. This hasty decision had fateful consequences. Southern Indochina was occupied by British troops who helped the

French crush the local revolution and restore their power in Cochinchina and Cambodia. A war of repression lasted for several months. Meanwhile, northern Indochina came under the occupation of Chinese armies, who preferred to tolerate the local revolution. They let Ho Chi Minh's Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) remain in place and also helped sustain a nationalist government in Laos.

Peter Worthing's book analyzes Chinese occupation policies in northern Vietnam from August 1945 to March 1946. First, however, the book provides a historical overview of Sino-Vietnamese relations and, in the following chapters, presents Chinese relations with Vietnamese nationalists during the Pacific War, the planning for the occupation, and how it came about. Then Worthing ventures into an attempt to defend the Chinese occupation record against the negative image of it in most Western (and Vietnamese) accounts. He claims that only "some of the units" behaved poorly and that "their behavior was not representative" (p. 71). This is hardly convincing. The arrival of a ragtag, poorly disciplined Chinese army, living off the country, was no doubt a heavy burden on a society that had just suffered a terrible famine.

Worthing's analysis of the crisis leading up to the Franco-Vietnamese agreement of March 6, 1946 is the book's most valuable contribution. Through a detailed account of Chinese decision-making in Hanoi and Chongqing, based both on Chinese and French sources, Worthing throws new light on the triangular Franco-Vietnamese-Chinese relationship. The French aim was to reoccupy northern Indochina, the Vietnamese to defend the young republic, while the Chinese did their best to avoid being caught in the middle of a Franco-Vietnamese war. A Franco-Chinese treaty was signed on February 28, with provisions for French reoccupation, but in the following week, while a French expeditionary force approached Haiphong, the Chinese put pressure on both sides to reach an agreement. Worthing shows that the Chinese actually *imposed* the March 6 agreement on the two parties. The present reviewer made the same claim in an article published in 1996 in *Cahiers de l'Institut d'Histoire du Temps Présent*. It is noticeable that two historians, independently of each other, have reached the same conclusion, since most accounts tend to ignore the Chinese role in obliging the two parties to sign.

The main long-term effect of the Chinese occupation was, says Worthing in the conclusion, to provide "time and opportunity for the Viet Minh to consolidate and triumph over domestic rivals . . . [and force] the French and Vietnamese to come to a peace agreement in March 1946." In the words of the author, the Chinese thus "made a substantial contribution to the Vietnamese Revolution" (p. 173). I agree.

After the account of the March 6 agreement, Worthing suddenly cuts off the analysis by stating that the accord "removed the last obstacle to the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Vietnam" (p. 170). This is incorrect. It took three more months with incidents and difficult negotiations before most of the Chinese troops withdrew in June, and the last unit left Haiphong only on September 18. Only then was the stage set for the Franco-Vietnamese war.

Worthing uses sources from archives in Nanjing, Taipei, Paris, Aix-en-Provence, and Washington. His new discoveries relate mainly to the relationship between the local occupation authorities in Hanoi, who sought to avoid trouble with the Vietnamese, and Jiang Jieshi's government in Chongqing, which sought to win control of Yunnan, placate the French, and prepare for a showdown with the Chinese Red Army in Manchuria.

Students will find Worthing's book engaging and informative, but it should be read critically, alongside other works, also because the author has refrained from using some relevant literature. I think primarily of Lin Hua's *Chiang Kai-shek, de Gaulle*

contre Hô Chi Minh (1994) and Thierry d'Argenlieu's *Chronique d'Indochine* (1985). Worthing also does not adequately use David Marr's *Vietnam 1945* (1995). Instead of reflecting Marr's demonstration that the revolution in August was not directed by a centralized Viet Minh league, but launched by local cadre, Worthing repeats the standard version that "when the Japanese surrendered on August 15, the Viet Minh immediately launched the insurrection" (p. 52).

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CHINA

Studies on Economic Reforms and Development in China. By SIWEI CHENG. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2001. xii, 347pp. \$29.95 (cloth).

The structural impediments to China's transition to a developed economy are vast and cumbersome, to say the least. From grappling with the consequences of dislocated workers from state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to creating an effective social security system to generating strong institutions in order to comply with the commitments in China's World Trade Organization accession protocol, these issues are on the minds of Chinese policymakers. As Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress in China, Siwei Cheng presents a compendium of ten policy prescriptions spread over ten chapters (of which eight papers were previously published) in *Studies on Economic Reforms and Development in China*. In his straightforward style, Cheng bounces among the United States, France, Singapore, and Germany, among others, in his search to find the appropriate economic and financial models to apply to China's metamorphic situation. Cheng's comparative analysis, while spanning the globe, ultimately brings him back, not surprisingly, to Deng Xiaoping Theory and the adoption of a socialist economy with Chinese characteristics.

The first five chapters deal with the "new economy," venture capital, the East Asian financial crisis, enterprise reform, and the management of SOEs, and are not new for the western reader of China. There is a sense throughout the first half of the book that Cheng is inspired, if not impressed, by the success of the economic liberalism in the industrialized countries and especially the United States. But, by the end, he is not blind to the greater social responsibilities that accompany economic benefits. And here is where Cheng is pessimistic about narrowing the gap between rich and poor in China. Moreover, he is also not as optimistic about China's ability to catch up in GDP terms to the U.S. "China still has a dual economy structure, with an agricultural economy and an industrial economy existing side by side. Industrialization has not been completed, science and technology lag far behind, technological innovation is weak, high-tech industrialization lacks momentum, the level of education is generally low, and the knowledge economy plays a minor role in economic development" (p. 21).

While generally supportive of China's accession to the WTO, Cheng points out