

Americans (or "Imperialism and all Reactionaries") (p. 90) "Paper tigers" (p. 90), he privately admitted that China did not want war with the United States, because the latter possessed "hydrogen and atomic bombs" (p. 190). This implied that US nuclear deterrence was by no means invalid despite Mao's public disclaimers. On the other hand, Mao did not think that the United States was prepared to fight China, and he was therefore willing to exploit "local wars of national liberation" (p. 167). The Soviet Union, conscious of maintaining its super power status, was more in line with the United States in its emphasis on nuclear weapons at the cost of conventional forces. Moscow was keen to resolve local issues, including that of Vietnam and Laos, through negotiations, rather than resorting to military force. Like the United States, the Soviet Union was also afraid of the possible escalation of limited wars into all-out nuclear war between the two superpowers, and preferred peaceful co-existence to war.

Thus, the book shows that China took a rather more radical stance towards the situation in Indochina, while the Soviet Union adopted a more cautious attitude to the conflict, especially as it would not have been in Soviet interests if the whole of Indochina fell completely under China's influence. The Sino-Soviet split thus increased Sino-Soviet competition over North Vietnam. Hanoi's power was insufficient to be able to mediate between the two Communist powers, but it weathered the crisis over the deepening Sino-Soviet antagonism rather well — Ho Chi Minh's frequent trips to Moscow and Beijing probably helped to persuade the two Communist powers that Vietnam wanted the support of both, and not one of them.

Ang admits that he could not find sufficient information about the internal factionalism within North Vietnam, but the book demonstrates that Ho Chi Minh's leadership seemed unassailable, despite the fact that he was often away either in Moscow or Beijing on business or on holidays. The book also shows that North Vietnam and China were both alarmed by Kennedy's intensive effort to secure a stable South Vietnam: in February 1962 the United States set up its Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) in Saigon, to which China responded by diverting its attention from Laos to Vietnam, and by providing its Vietnamese comrades with more material support. Thus, the more effort the United States put into South Vietnam, the greater was the incentive for the North (which was by then backed by both China and the Soviet Union) to intensify Communist activities in the South. This created a vicious circle for the United States. By the summer of 1962, Laos was temporarily neutralized, and increasing attention was given to Vietnam by the United States and the two Communist powers. Ang has succeeded admirably in dealing with the complex issue of Indochina as seen from Beijing, Hanoi, and Moscow, and the book will be an important source for all students and scholars studying the Vietnam War.

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**The End of the Vietnamese Monarchy.** By BRUCE MCFARLAND LOCKHART. New Haven: Yale Center for International Studies, 1993. Pp. 243. Bibliography.

This short study, which is based on the author's doctoral dissertation from Cornell

University on *Monarchy and Monarchism in Siam and Vietnam, 1925–46*, was published well before the death of Bảo Đại, the last Vietnamese Emperor, in 1997. Its topic is the Vietnamese monarchy during his reign (1925–45), and the “Bảo Đại solution” (1949–55).

Bảo Đại's life can be divided in six periods: (1) From his birth in 1913 to his arrival in Huế in 1932. Although enthroned in 1926, Bảo Đại only exercised his protected powers beginning in 1932. The ten previous years were spent in France, where a French couple guided his education. (2) The period as a monarch supervised by a French *Résident Supérieur* from 1932 to the Japanese coup on 9 March 1945. (3) The four months as Japanese-protected emperor from his independence declaration on 11 March 1945 to his solemn abdication on 30 August 1945. (4) The years 1945–49, when he was nominally Supreme Advisor to Hồ Chí Minh's republican government, but spent most of the time in China, Hong Kong and France, where he was persuaded to spearhead the counter-revolutionary “Bảo Đại solution”. (5) The years as head-of-state in South Vietnam from his return in 1949 to his deposition by Ngô Đình Diệm in 1955, shortly before the French departure from South Vietnam. (6) His long “after-life” in France, 1955–97.

Lockhart's book is not a biography, but an analysis of the Vietnamese monarchy. He approaches his topic from three angles: French colonial policy, Court policies, and Vietnamese elite opinions (as expressed in the press). The greater part of the work deals with the years 1925–45. With Bảo Đại's abdication in 1945 “the Nguyễn Dynasty came to an end,” says Lockhart (p. 153). He then adds a brief chapter on “the Bảo Đại solution”, ending in 1955, at which point “the Vietnamese monarchy came to an end once and for all” (p. 155).

Apart from a succession of French Governors General and High Commissioners, three men deeply influenced the fate of the Vietnamese monarchy during its final decades: Phạm Quỳnh (1892–1945), Ngô Đình Diệm (1901–1963), and Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969). Phạm Quỳnh and Ngô Đình Diệm figure prominently in Lockhart's account. The former was appointed Head of Bảo Đại's first cabinet (Cơ Mật) in 1933, while the latter was Minister of the Interior. The young, ambitious Diệm soon lost his post, for complex reasons (p. 82), while Phạm Quỳnh stayed on as the main leader of the Court until March 1945. He was murdered during the revolution in August. Phạm Quỳnh's journal articles (some of which were re-edited by his children in 1985: *Le Viet-Nam (essais 1922–1932)*, 2 vols. Paris: Ý Việt, 1985) are important sources for Lockhart's study.

Like most others, Lockhart points out how the French curtailed Bảo Đại's attempts in 1932–33 to carry out reforms and play a genuine role. The author sees this as a consequence of the French ideology of the monarchy, which underrated the importance of actual power and overrated the spiritual and symbolic authority of the emperor. Perhaps it had more to do with self-interest.

Diệm, a life-long foe of the French, reappears in Lockhart's account as a candidate to form a national government in March 1945 and then, of course, as the prime minister who gave the monarchy its deathblow in 1955. Lockhart makes little of the more distant relationship between Bảo Đại and Hồ Chí Minh. As Supreme Advisor, though, Bảo Đại took part in some of Hồ's cabinet meetings in 1945–46. Hồ must have despised Bảo Đại, but the president's statements about the former emperor in 1945–49 were restrained, almost fatherly (e.g., interview with Hồ Chí Minh in *Giờ Mới*, 7 Feb. 1948). It was not till February 1949 that Hồ Chí Minh said Vĩnh Thụy (Bảo Đại's name before and after his reign) had lost his post as Supreme Advisor.

Lockhart's study is well-structured, detached and balanced in its judgements, and the information provided is accurate. Lockhart uses a wealth of published and unpublished Vietnamese and French sources. He (and the publisher) deserve praise for including diacritics when rendering Vietnamese words. Unfortunately, however, the book lacks an index. There is also a lack of more general, causal analysis. Although the book is derived from a comparative study of monarchism in Siam and Vietnam, there is no attempt to ask why the Vietnamese monarchy ended while the Siamese survived, or to situate the Vietnamese monarchy within the history of (Asian) monarchies in general. Lockhart never really asks *why* the monarchy ended or if it *had to end*. He just tells how it happened, and dwells on how contemporaries *wanted* the monarchy to be (the "ideology" of monarchy). The short concluding chapter deals with the pitfalls of French policy towards the monarchy, with emphasis on the period before Bảo Đại, and discusses when the Nguyễn dynasty lost its Heavenly Mandate (*Thiên mệnh*). This also probably happened before the time of Bảo Đại. The implication seems to be that the monarchy was doomed before the period under study, but the author does not say so. Instead he starts his conclusion by claiming that by 1932, "the prospects for Vietnam's Nguyễn Dynasty seemed relatively bright".

When it was published in 1993, Bruce McFarland Lockhart's study filled a void in Western-language literature on the political history of Vietnam. Most other books on the twentieth-century focus on colonial policy, the rise of nationalism and communism, or the Indochina Wars. The only Western language book with an explicit focus on the monarchy under Bảo Đại, was his own autobiography, *Le Dragon d'Annam* (Paris: Plon, 1980), which mainly reveals a bad memory. However, when Bảo Đại died in 1997, a new work was published about him in France (Daniel Grandclément's *Bao Dai ou les derniers jours de l'empire d'Annam* [Paris: JC Lattès, 1997]) without any reference to Lockhart's work. Grandclément's book is not academic, but is directed at a wider audience. By contrast to Lockhart, Grandclément deals as much with Bảo Đại as a person as with the fate of the monarchy. Grandclément does not draw on much scholarly literature, but on a fair amount of archival sources. His book is eminently readable, and also includes some useful insights. It deserves to be read alongside Lockhart's scholarly analysis. More studies are needed, though, on the decline of the Nguyễn dynasty.

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**Hill Tribes of Vietnam.** By JOACHIM SCHLIESINGER. 2 Volumes. Bangkok: White Lotus, 1997. Pp. xii, 74; Pp. xii, 132. Tables, Maps, Illustrations, Bibliography.

The ethnic minorities of Vietnam are less covered in modern social science literature than are their neighbours in northern Thailand, for example. This is due to a variety of reasons foremost of which is that the territories where many minorities live have been restricted areas for foreigners from the time of the Vietnam War up to the late 1980s. Apart from studies of some ethnic groups in the Central Highlands (notably, Gerald Hickey's works) and some US Military handbooks, there are few internationally published