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**EUROPA
EINE KULTURELLE HERAUSFORDERUNG FÜR DIE
NORDISCHEN LÄNDER**

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IS NORWAY A EUROPEAN COUNTRY?

by Stein Tønnesson, (Oslo)

Er Norge et europeisk land? Ist Norwegen ein Europäisches Land? La Norvège, est-elle un pays européen? Is Norway a European Country?

While the other speakers address the audience in the host's own European language, I -- as a Norwegian -- prefer to speak in the extra-European tongue of the Atlantic and the global community. Most of my fellow countrymen would have done the same. We do not feel comfortable with continental habits and are culturally closer to the British Isles, North America, the high seas, Mount Everest and the United Nations, than to the castles and crowded towns of Europe, be they French, Polish, German -- or Swedish. Norway is, to quote a famous statement by a former Norwegian prime minister, "a country in the world".

Is Norway not only a country in the world, but also a European country? If we drew a line around that part of the world we call Europe and deduced that all countries inside the line are European, the answer would be evident and also very dull: Norway is a European country, and I could end the lecture here.

I shall not end yet, but instead apply a more demanding definition of 'being European'. To be European, a country's own population must have some feeling of a European identity in addition to its national identity, and this European identity must have a positive meaning. There must exist a kind of European 'we-feeling', as expressed in notions such as "we Europeans", "we in Europe", "here in Europe", "our Europe", "our European house", "our European community", "our European culture", "our European values", "we who respect Jean Monnet", "the spirit of Maastricht", etc. I shall try to establish the evidence required to convince you -- and myself -- that Norway is not in this sense a European country, and is unlikely to become one in the foreseeable future.

I shall approach the task from five perspectives: encyclopedial, historical, socio-cultural, text-analytical-political, and barometrical.

The encyclopedial approach

There is no doubt that Norway is peripheral to many Europeans, and in order to make the continent look bigger, most of the Norwegian territory is frequently left out on maps of Europe, but virtually anyone in the world who has an idea of where Norway is situated, would consider it a country in Northern Europe.

Non-Norwegian encyclopedia

This can easily be confirmed by examining a sample of encyclopedia. Most of the world's encyclopedia apply the dull, deductive method I just mentioned, and thus present Norway as a country in (Northern) Europe. The French *Petit Robert* and the *Larousse* both say Norway is an "Etat de l'Europe du Nord" (*Petit Robert*, Paris, 1985; *Larousse*, 1975, vol. 14, p. 8594). The German *Brochhaus* and *Meyers* say respectively that Norway is a "Staat in Nordeuropa" (*Brochhaus*, 1991, vol. 19, p. 704) and a "konstitutionelle Monarchie in Nordeuropa" (*Meyers*, 1976, vol. 17, p. 428). The American *Encyclopaedia Britannica* agrees that Norway "occupies the western half of the Scandinavian peninsula of Northern Europe". The British *Europa Yearbook* makes the same claim: "The Kingdom of Norway forms the western part of Scandinavia, in northern Europe." And the Great Soviet Encyclopedia (the only I have seen to include a photograph of an anti-EC demonstration in Oslo) also fully agrees: "N. - state in N. Europe on the W. and the far N. of the Scandinavian peninsula" (1964, vol. 18, p. 104). I have found similar statements in Finnish, Latvian, Polish, Romanian, Spanish, Catalan, Dutch, Italian, Jewish, and Icelandic encyclopedia. They all place Norway in Northern Europe.

There are, however, a few interesting exceptions from the general rule. The first exception is the Swedish encyclopedia. Although they define Sweden and Denmark as monarchies in Northern Europe (*Svensk uppslagsbok*, 1965, vol. 28, p. 242; *Bra Böckers Lexikon*, 1978, vol. 17, p. 129), they do not mention Northern Europe in the entry on Norway (vol. 21, cols. 281-2). This may be easily explained: the entries on Norway seem to have been written by Norwegians. The new Swedish *Nationalencyklopedin* has not yet published the volume with Norway in it, but Denmark remains a monarchy in Northern Europe (p. 379). The second exception is *Meyers Neues Lexikon* (Leipzig, 1974), which was published in the former German Democratic Republic. It places Norway in Scandinavia, but does not mention Europe.

The third exception is the French *Encyclopædia Universalis* (Paris, 1985, vol. 13, p. 127) which approaches Norway ethnically instead of geographically, and thus describes all Norwegians except the Same as "Germains" -- Germanians, and starts its description of the people and their country from there.

The fourth and most interesting exception from the rule that all encyclopedia have Norway as a country in Northern Europe, is the Spanish *Gran Enciclopedia Rialp* (Madrid, 1973, tomo XVII, p. 30). Instead of the usual deductive approach, it applies an inductive, Norwegian perspective in the opening phrases of the entry on Norway, singling out four features that determine Norwegian identity: 1) the country is far to the north; 2) it is mountainous; 3) it is maritime; 4) it is the least inhabited of the Nordic countries. The authors of this article have tried to understand Norway on its own terms,

but also in a comparative perspective. The Spanish article can indeed be used as a background for the attempt I am now going to make to read *between the lines* of Norwegian encyclopedia.

Norwegian encyclopedia

Let me start with the standard Norwegian encyclopedia: Kunnskapforlagets *Store Norske Leksikon*. If we look up the opening paragraph on 'Norge' (Norway) (*Store Norske Leksikon*, 1988, vol. 10, p. 254), it provides -- as a probably unintended effect of a failed attempt to be objectively deductive -- a remarkable demonstration of how relevant the inductive Spanish analysis just quoted is. Indeed I find the opening paragraph of the Norwegian auto-presentation to be a most amusing piece of Norwegian literature:

NORGE

Norge (bokmål), *Noreg* (nynorsk). Kongeriket Norge består av den vestlige og nordlige del av Skandinaviske halvøy samt øygruppen Svalbard og øya Jan Mayen i det nordlige Atlanterhavet; dertil kommer tre biland, Bouvetøya i Atlanterhavet, sør for Afrika, Peter Is øy i Sillehavet, sørvest av Sør-Amerikas sørspiss, og Dronning Maud Land, en sektor av Sydpollaret, sør for Atlanterhavet. Norge er nr. 4 av Europas land etter areal (nr. 5 fraregnet Svalbard/Jan Mayen), nr. 22 etter folketallet, Sovjetunionen og Tyrkia ikke medregnet. -- Norge grenser i øst mot Sverige, Finland og Sovjetunionen. I nord, vest og sør er landet omgitt av hav, i nordøst Barentshavet, i nordvest Norskehavet, i vest og sørvest Nordisjøen og i sørøst Skagerrak.

The paragraph only very implicitly admits that Norway is a European country by stating that Norway is no. 4 among the European countries in terms of territory, but *before* that implicit concession is made, the article has had time to mention that Norway is a part of Scandinavia, that it includes a number of islands in the Northern Atlantic, another island in the Atlantic south of Africa, yet another one in the Pacific southwest of South America, and that Norway also consists of a section of the Antarctic landmass, south of the Atlantic. The word 'Atlantic' is mentioned three times before the reader is informed that Norway is Europe's fourth largest country.

Very similar presentations can be found in other Norwegian encyclopedia (*Aschehougs Konversasjonsleksikon*, 1972, vol. 14, p. 482; *Caplex*, 1990, p. 640). Only one of them follows the international encyclopedial standard of situating Norway in Northern Europe (*Verden i dag, Samtidsleksikon*, 1970, but then that entry was written by a 'renegade' Europeanist: Tim Greve).

How does *Store Norske Leksikon* present the other Nordic countries? Here there are interesting differences: Iceland is "an independent republic on an island of the same name in the northern Atlantic..." (vol. 6, p. 350). No reference is made to Europe. Finland is situated at the northern border of human settlement ("Finland ligger ved nordgrænsen for boscningen i verden") and is said to have been the "outpost of Norden in the east and at the same time a bridge between west and east" (vol. 4, p. 245). Again, there is no reference to Europe. Denmark is quite similarly defined as a "bridge between the continent and Scandinavia", once again with no reference to Europe (vol. 3, p. 175). But with Sweden it is different. Sweden is not accredited with any bridging function, but is coldly and unlovingly defined as a "monarchy in Northern Europe" (vol. 11, p. 331). Thus in the perspective of *Store Norske Leksikon*, Sweden appears to be the only fully-fledged European country in Norden.

A less widespread, but quite influential dictionary in Norwegian intellectual circles was published by the leftist publisher PAX in the years 1978-81: *PAX-leksikon*. The dictionary includes a 14 pp. article on Norway, which describes it as an exceptionally homogenous country on the Scandinavian peninsula, in Norden, with relations to Great Britain and the Atlantic community and with a certain position in *the world*. In the article, the reader looks in vain, however, for an admission that Norway is a country in Europe. It says repeatedly that Norway is a country in the world, and the last section is entitled "Norway and the World", but Europe is only mentioned in relation to two political conflicts, that over prohibition against alcohol in the 1920s, and that over whether or not to join the EC in 1972. After I had failed to find a statement to the effect that Norway is European in the article on Norway, I tried to look at *PAX-leksikon's* article on Europe, but discovered that there was no such article. There are entrances on "Eurocommunism" and on "The European Movement", but not on Europe as such. The entrance on "the European Movement", I may add, refers to "the so-called 'European idea' ... the idealistic conception that the unification of Europe might contribute to preventing a new destructive war between the Central European powers." And the author of the article (Nils Petter Gleditsch) focuses much of his attention on the fact that the European Movement had received funding from the CIA (*PAX-leksikon*, vol. 2, pp. 233-34; to do justice to the editors of *PAX-leksikon*, I must add that it does not include any articles on continents, just on states).

The encyclopedial approach thus seems to confirm my hypothesis that Norway is not a European country.

The historical approach

The same can easily be substantiated through a historical approach. Let me first warn you that what I say in the following may be somewhat exaggerated. It should sometimes be understood ironically, but my general message is serious: it is easy to use Norwegian history as a means to desist or refuse European identity, but it is difficult to use it to promote such identity. Those Norwegian historians who have not specialized on the Second World War, NATO or the Cold War, are also massively anti-EC. I shall base my general message in three arguments.

First, it must not be forgotten that in contrast to the Danes and the Swedes, Norwegians have continuously upheld a sense of being a courageous people with a heroic past. Swedes and Danes are astonished when they see Norwegians take off their caps, wave their flags and chant the national hymn without a stroke of irony. Whenever there was a bellicose Dane in this century, he looked to Norway for his ideal: Let me quote from Johannes V. Jensen's description of the atmosphere on board his ship when he first approached the Norwegian coast (I'm sorry, the quotation must be in Danish):

Jeg har aldrig nogensinde kunnet glemme den religiøse og krigeriske andagt, hvormed norske bønder hilsende deres fædreland, da vi fik de første klipper i sigte ud for Lister ... Der var i stilhed, af sig selv som naar noget samler sig i naturen, bleven en skare af dem oppe paa forskibet, en uvejrssky ... og pludselig begynde den at give tonet! Saa spontant, saa mørkt og vældigt tænker jeg Cromwells soldater har sunget foran slaget. Det var elementerne selv, havet og skærene, de ydterste forpaster af Norge, der sang ... " (Jensen, 1914)

The peace that has reigned for so long in Scandinavia is due to Danish and Swedish pacifism, not to Norwegian. Peace is not something Norwegians have been particularly proud of: "Dog Fred er ej det Bedste, men at man Noget vil", said Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson (Then Peace is not the Best, but that one has the will to accomplish Something). A recent book on the 18th century, written by a professor of history in Oslo with the aim not only to explore history, but also to prepare Norwegians for another heroic "no" to amalgamation in the EC, emphasizes the traditional fighting spirit of Norwegian peasants. In the 17th and 18th century, they paid less taxes to the Danish king than their continental brethren because they revolted more easily, and because they were such good soldiers: their taxes were payed in blood, in struggles against the Swedes (Lunden, 1992).

In 1814, the Danish-Norwegian king surrendered Norway to Sweden without a fight, but the Norwegians took up the struggle on their own against the Swedish army, and obtained from the Swedish king an independent constitution, thus reconstituting the

state which had been lost in the late middle ages. In 1884, Norwegian rifle rings were ready to fight for the Norwegian Storting (parliament) in its struggle with the Swedish king and his conservative Norwegian government. When there was no armed struggle, it was not the fault of the Norwegians, but because the king decided to give in. The same story repeated itself in 1905, when Norwegians constructed fortresses and were prepared to fight for full independence, but in the end did not have to, because Sweden conceded what Norway had demanded. In 1945, after the allied victory, Norwegians despised the Swedes for their cowardly neutrality, and the Danes for their softness, although those feelings were weaker than the contempt that was felt in Norway towards its own government for not having prepared the Norwegian army for resisting the German invaders. The watchword "Never another 9 April" has been repeated over and over again in Norway since the end of the Second World War: in the commemoration speeches every year on the date of the German invasion, and each time the defence budget is discussed in the Storting. One of the funniest jokes ever phrased in Norway is an anti-nationalist slogan formulated by a shortlived figure named Leif Sonell: "Never another 1905".

My second point is that with a possible exception for the Finnish-speaking Finns, Norwegians are probably the least Nordic of the Nordic peoples. The most Nordic of the state peoples is -- or at least used to be -- the Swedes. Sweden is so Nordic and so little Swedish that in the textbooks of Swedish schools, the words Norden and Sweden tend to mean the same thing. At present, however, this is about to change: while the Swedish elite is in a process of transforming its identity from 'Norden' to Europe or 'the Baltic region', a significant part of the formerly so modern Nordic populace in Sweden seems to react by reverting to a long lost historical "Swedishness"; for the first time in fifty years, Swedes are reading books about ancient battles. The Danes have also been far more Nordic than the Norwegians, but they have desperately wanted the Norwegians to share their Nordic-ness in order to counterbalance the Swedish hegemony within the Nordic sphere. The small Nordic peoples, the Icelanders, Faeroic, Samec, Inuit and the Swedish-speaking Finns have felt a need for the Nordic arena, but Norwegians have been lukewarm. The Nordic Council is popularly known in Norway as the 'soup council'. When it was known in 1991 that Sweden had applied for EC membership, it had little or no effect on Norwegian polls. Norway has prospered as a country in the world with shipping and oil rather than Nordic soup, and has had a sense of playing a role in the UN and NATO.

My third point is commonplace: Norway has primarily been oriented towards the West, not the continent. In the 19th and much of the 20th century, an enormous lot of Norwegians had a dream of America, but when the general secretary of the Norwegian labour party declared himself a couple of years ago to have a dream of Europe, he had little tradition to build upon (Jagland, 1990). In 1905, Norway looked to Britain for support in its claim for full independence from Sweden, and during the First World War,

Norway was what has been termed a 'neutral ally' (Riste, 1965). During the Second World War, the Norwegian government was in exile in London, while inside the collaborating fascist party in Norway there raged a bitter struggle between a nationalist and a small Europe-oriented Germanic faction (Sørensen, 1989). In 1949, after a brief period of so-called bridge-building, Norway opted for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization instead of a Nordic defence union. To say it crudely, the east-west conflict was ideal for the ambitions of the Norwegian foreign policy elite. One only has to look at a map of the planned itineraries of the superpower's missiles to understand why Norwegian politicians felt they were important in Washington. The Norwegian political elite had a sense of playing an important role in one of the most significant international alliances, and the fact that Sweden was not a member hardly reduced the pleasure. The Cold War of course had its disadvantages. First of all, it was rather more dangerous than even a heroic people would prefer, and then also NATO was disgustingly capitalist and conservative. The extreme left in Norway was therefore anti-NATO, but that does not mean it saw Europe as an alternative (Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber *The American Challenge* was translated, but not read). They rather saw Europe as a CIA-funded NATO invention, and the hopes of the left were invested, at first, in an independent third alternative, with Tito's Yugoslavia as a model and, later, in a global solidarity movement with Cuba, Vietnam, Nicaragua, South-Africa and the "Third World".

To sum up: the dominant Norwegian political traditions are on the side of those who do not want to be either Nordic or European. Apart from the well-established Norwegian identity, the history of Norway can easily be used to underpin traditions for Atlantic and global identities, but hardly for a Nordic or European one. In fact, the most promising road to Europe for Norway would lead through the West -- with England and America to Europe. That, indeed, has been the road taken by the urban, Europeanized Norwegian elite. Twice did that elite apply for EC membership, not because it felt much European identity or enthusiasm, but because the United Kingdom applied, and because one might lose markets and influence if remaining outside. Since the 1960s, the elite has gradually become less British and American and a bit more German and Nordic than it used to be. But then the crux is that the Europeanized urban elite in Norway does not control the popular sentiment. That leads me to...

The socio-cultural approach

A socio-cultural approach is bound -- I'm sorry to disappoint my European audience once again -- provide further fuel to my contention that Norway is not European. According to a thirty year old classical article by the Norwegian sociologists Stein Rokkan and Henry Valen there are five main dimensions of conflict in the Norwegian political system

(Rokkan & Valen, 1964, p. 166): 1) the territorial opposition between capital and provinces (centre and periphery); 2) "the socio-cultural conflict between the academically educated 'Europeanized' officials and patricians in the cities and the increasingly status-conscious and nation-oriented peasants in the rural districts"; 3) "a religious opposition between the secularism and tolerant liberalism of the established urban population and the orthodox and fundamentalist Lutheranism of large sections of the rural and recently urbanized population"; 4) an economic conflict between buyers and sellers of agricultural products; and 5) an economic conflict between employers and salaried employees.

If we look away from the class conflict, which has not been pertinent to the issue of Norway's position in Europe, we get a system of socio-cultural conflict which arose during the nation-building period in the 19th century and has permeated some of the most frightful political conflicts in the 20th century: the struggle over whether to grant concessions to foreigners for utilization of Norwegian resources in the century's first decade; the drawn-out struggle over how certain verbs in the two Norwegian languages (bokmål and nynorsk), as well as an inbetween compromise language (samnorsk), should be conjugated; the battle over the prohibition against alcohol in the 1920s; the EC struggle of the early 1970s and now again in the 1990s. In the cities there exists a pro-modern, internationally oriented, self-conscious elite which thinks that the individual must be allowed some degree of choice over whether to drink alcohol or not, and that it would be nice if Gro Harlem Brundtland and Thorvald Stoltenberg had some influence in international affairs. This city-based elite (the "Oslo west segment" as one prominent EC-opponent (Stein Ørnshøj) has called it) has repeatedly run its head into the main socio-cultural traditions of the non-urban regions. If the elite wants to get something through in Norwegian politics, it must be able to draw support from at least one of these cultural traditions.

The socio-cultural traditions in the periphery are four in number. Let me start with the two that exist in the parts of Norway where class conflict based on inequality has played a dominant political role. That is the fertile agricultural areas of eastern Norway, and the fishing regions of Northern Norway. In both of these regions, socialist radicalism has had a major role to play, and entrepreneurial talents are scarce. The only way the urban foreign policy elite can influence the electorate is through the Labour party (Det Norske Arbeiderparti). This failed in 1972 and may very well fail again. The people of these parts are heavily anti-EC and are likely to abandon the Labour party and vote for the anti-EC Socialist Left Party instead, when the EC-struggle becomes further accentuated.

The third peripheral culture is based in the mountain valleys and around the fjords: "fjell- og fjord-Norge" (Øidne, 1957). It is the most nationalist of all Norwegian cultural traditions, with radical and anti-elitist political leanings, an attitude originally inspired by the Nordic movement generated by the Dane N.S. Grundtvig, and a cultural programme based on "nynorsk", the most anti-Danish of the two Norwegian scriptures developed in

the age of nationalism. This culture used to form one of the two main premises for the radical party "Venstre", but that party has been radically diminished, and the valley-fjord tradition is now rather more attracted to the agriculturalist Centre Party (Senterpartiet), and to Erik Solheim's environmentalized version of the formerly socialist Socialist Left Party (Sosialistisk Venstreparti).

The fourth culture is the religious belt around the southern and western coast: the "dark coastal strip" (den mørke kyststripe) as urban cosmopolitans call it, with prohibitions against alcohol, dance and fun, a strict moral code, but yet a certain entrepreneurial instinct and sense for how to make money. Since the 1970s, parts of this culture have entered a love-hate relationship with the oil economy. The people of the dark coast tend to oppose EC-membership, but not the EEA agreement, provided it does not mean Norway has to reduce the prices on alcohol. Studies of the referendum on the prohibition against alcohol in 1926 and on EC-membership in 1972 have shown a remarkable parallel as to the regional distribution of yes and no-votes.

Since 1972, not only Europe has changed, but Norway as well. The Norwegian periphery gained enormously from the green, anti-urban climate of the 1970s. The non-urban sector was given sizeable subsidies to keep up the population in the countryside, which continued to decrease anyway, but those who chose to remain obtained an impressive standard on housing and infrastructure, while the towns were left somewhat to wither. Now more people live less comfortably than before in the towns while fewer people live more comfortably than before in the districts. The latter have a clear, realistic sense of what they will lose if Norway joins the EC. This provides for a thorough reaccentuation of the traditional anti-elitist political cultures in the period ahead of us, engineered by the peripheral elite.

The only section of the population which played a major role in the anti-EC struggle in 1972, but is a much less important asset for Norwegian nationalism today, is the anti-capitalist urban-based youth. The young revolutionaries of the early 1970s are now not so young and much less revolutionary. Quite a few of them have changed their mind about the EC, but they are blemished by their more faithful comrades with a term that Norwegians tend to interpret as an insult: "town radical" (byradikaler). If that term is used against a Norwegian leftist, he really gets a bad conscience. Some of the really young, however (those who were too young to be young in 1972), are less burdened by the historical fusion of internationalist socialism and Norwegian nationalism. This time it is more difficult than in the 1970s to mobilize those young people who want a better world in the struggle against EC-membership. Some even tend to see the EC as a useful tool in working for the embetterment of the human condition.

I have tried here to convey an impression of the socio-cultural environment that pro-EC politicians in Norway in some way or another must try to impress, if they are to avoid being left on the outside of the integration process in Europe. Let me then move to

an examination of the ways in which two leading politicians have tried to impress their people.

The text-analytical-political approach

I would have liked to undertake a systematic study of how Europe is referred to in Norwegian mass media, but since that would be a major enterprise, I shall concentrate on two examples of one type of text: the political speech or lecture. On this occasion, I shall spare the opponents of EC membership from critical examination, although it would have been tempting to pick out for scrutiny some basic statements of the two foremost populist political leaders: the centrist Anne Enger Lahnstein and the radical environmentalist Erik Solheim.

Instead I shall examine the key speeches of 4 April 1992 by prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland and foreign minister Thorvald Stoltenberg, at important regional meetings of the ruling Labour Party (Det Norske Arbeiderparti). This was the occasion when the prime minister chose to announce her intention to ask the party's next congress for a decision in favour of applying once again to the EC for help to make Norway European. The speeches should be interpreted partly as indicators of how two powerful internationalized Norwegians *think* about Norway's relationship to (or position in) Europe, partly as an indicator of what two centrally placed politicians find it wise to tell a Norwegian audience.

Before analyzing them separately, let me note that both of these speeches consistently refer to Norway as a European country, a country in Europe. In the two speeches, one looks in vain for a juxtaposition of two expressions that are otherwise extremely common in Norwegian literature and public debate: "her hjemme" (here at home), and "ut i Europa" (out in Europe). Stoltenberg and Brundtland both consistently spoke about "the rest of Europe" or "the other European countries" when they were referring to other parts of Europe. This means that they have internalized the idea that Norway is European to an extent that is still rare in Norway. It remains common to speak of Norway *and* Europe, or the Norwegian connection to Europe instead of Norway's position *in* Europe. Conjunctions and prepositions are important from a text-analytical viewpoint.

Thorvald Stoltenberg started his speech by referring to Europe as "our own part of the world that we Norwegians are trying again to clarify our way of belonging to", and his speech ended in a proclamation that "all peoples in Europe (now) seek together to form in voluntary cooperation the society of tomorrow" (Stoltenberg, 1992, p. 35). But already in his second sentence, Stoltenberg went on the defensive and quoted a forty year old warning from a Norwegian Christian politician against any kind of union with other

countries. Stoltenberg then started to argue against nostalgic uses of Norwegian history, and thus confirmed that national history is on the side of the opponents. *Today* it is no longer possible for one single country to decide its own destiny, Stoltenberg claimed. Politicians must relate to the trend of internationalization. Stoltenberg emphasized the great changes that had occurred in Europe since 1972. The various countries are now "forced together" by common problems. After a brief appeal to the traditional internationalism of the workers movement, he described how a new security structure is emerging in Europe, and then suddenly revealed what may indeed be one of the foreign policy elite's innermost anxieties: the risk that Sweden, through membership in the EC and the West European Union, might get a closer relationship to the other NATO members than Norway has traditionally enjoyed by way of its NATO membership. The crux of this argument is that if the Norwegian people prevents its government from joining the EC, then Sweden may take over Norway's privileged access to the great western powers. Let me quote from Stoltenberg's expression of his fear: "Maybe we shall have to go to Stockholm to get information about the security- and defence policies of our NATO partners?" (Stoltenberg, 1992, p. 37). This argument presents in a nutshell the Atlantic road to Europe of an internationalized political elite whose regional identity to a great extent resides in its rivalry with big brother Sweden. Stoltenberg returned to the Nordic aspect of the issue later in his speech, announcing that for him, the idea of having the EC border at Svinesund (the place where highway E6 crosses from Norway into former Norwegian territory in Sweden) was "no pleasant thought". He emphasized that cooperation in the EC is more intense and elaborate than the cooperation which has been established between the Nordic countries, and that a unified Norden in the EC would have considerable weight. The Nordic countries, with their 20 million people would have more votes in the EC Council of Ministers than Germany with its 80 million. So we see that Stoltenberg also had an offensive Nordic approach. In his long speech, he went through many of the fields where the EC countries cooperate: the internal market, the struggle to overcome unemployment, the environment, security policy, etc. What lacked in the speech, was the cultural aspect. The idea of belonging to a European culture is weak indeed in Norway, and in the speech analysed here, Stoltenberg made no attempt to promote that idea. In order to convince his listeners he used two basic techniques:

1. to portray EC membership as *a necessity*, something that is forced upon us by uncontrollable international developments, no matter whether we like it or not. Norway has already become so dependent upon other countries that it is impossible to decide our own future on our own. There are only two alternatives: join the EC, or adapt ourselves passively to everything that is decided by the EC (at worst with Sweden as an influential member);

2. to quote key statements by well known opponents of EC membership during the great debates of 1972 (Per Borten, Lars Korvald), and turn them rhetorically into

arguments in favour of EC-membership. Today the best way that "Norwegian women and men" can influence their own destiny is to form the society of tomorrow in cooperation with the other peoples in Europe.

The aim of both techniques was to influence the Labour Party (and the electorate) towards a pro-EC stance, but without any identification with a *vision* of Europe.

Gro Harlem Brundtland's speech was more visionary and statesmanlike, less tactical and less Norwegian. Her message was not that Norwegians had to adapt themselves to necessities dictated by international developments. Instead she asked for support from the Norwegians in her attempt to accomplish her vision for Europe's future: "our vision" as she called it -- in a careful move towards the Thatcherist majestic plural. Gro Harlem Brundtland's vision was a greater European cooperation, with all the Nordic peoples as participants, and Eastern Europe as well. That vision had been the basis for the EEA process between the EC and EFTA, and whilst the process was underway, the incredible developments had occurred -- the fall of the east-west divide in Europe -- and this had suddenly made it possible to realize "our vision" of all-European cooperation, with the EC as the main motor. In 1972 there had been a risk that Denmark and Norway on the one hand, and Sweden and Finland on the other, would grow increasingly apart because of Danish and Norwegian EC membership. But then Norway had said "no". Now the situation is completely different. Now, the whole of Norden may join together. The question, as Gro Harlem Brundtland defined it, was "whether we too should join our Nordic neighbours now that they have decided to bring the majority of the population of the Nordic region into the European Community" (Brundtland, 1992, p. 24). Repeatedly in her intense and well-structured speech, she applied a four-level overlapping identity ladder, where all four levels were given a positive meaning: local, national, Nordic and European. She did not shy away from supporting the contention that the nation state is too small to solve humanity's big problems and too big to solve the small ones, but still necessary to solve a lot of problems on the intermediary level. When she finally arrived at the section on security policy, she made her key statement about Norway's position, not in relation to Europe, but *in* Europe:

Debatten om Europas sikkerhet blir utfullstendig om man forsøker å overse den gjensidige avhengigheten mellom Norge, Norden og det øvrige Europa. Geografisk ligger vi i utkanten. Men politisk og strategisk ligger vi ikke i periferien! Vi er en del av det Europa som strekker seg fra Atlanterhavet til Ural, fra Svalbard i Nord til Middelhavet i sør. (The debate about European security remains incomplete if the mutual dependency between Norway, Norden and the other parts of Europe were to be neglected. Geographically we are situated in the periphery. But politically and strategically we are not! We are a part of a Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Ural, from Svalbard in the north to the Mediterranean in the south.)

In conclusion to the text-analytical-political approach, I will say that while the speech of the foreign minister to some extent confirmed the common pattern of Norwegian thinking about the nation's place in the world -- EC membership is desirable because it can contribute to maintaining Norwegian prosperity and influence, not because of any positive European identity -- the speech of the prime minister was of a more visionary kind (ironically, the distribution of roles between the Danish prime and foreign minister is exactly the opposite). If her approach is adopted by a larger part of the Norwegian policy-making elite, it may prepare the way for a positive identification with Europe and a greater Norwegian role in Nordic and European affairs. If Gro Harlem Brundtland does not succeed, however, it will indicate that she has departed too strongly from the national socio-cultural scene, that she has simply become too European.

The barometrical approach

I have come to my last approach, the barometrical. In November 1991 and again in April 1992, a sample of 1,000 Norwegians were asked, within the framework of the EC's so-called Eurobarometer, the following question: "Do you ever think of yourself as not only Norwegian, but also European? Does this happen often, sometimes or never?" (Eurobarometer, 1992)

45% answered "never", 35-40% "sometimes" and 15% "often". Other identities, such as local, ethnic, regional, Atlantic or global, were not included in the poll, but within such a homogenous country as Norway, we may assume that the 45% who said "never" constitute what we may call the pure Norwegians. The 15% are the European Norwegians, while the 35-40% are those who are predominantly Norwegian, but sometimes think of themselves as European, for instance when they meet Americans, when they choose between a European and a Japanese car, or when they think about their wish that Norway should join the EC.

Among those who favour Norwegian EC-membership, however, there were as many as 33% who never think of themselves as European, and among those who oppose EC-membership, only 55% never think of themselves as European. Thus there is less correlation between pro-EC sentiment and European identity than one might have thought. A significant number of pro-EC Norwegians never think of themselves as Europeans, and a significant number of anti-EC Norwegians do sometimes think of themselves as Europeans.

The sample does not make it possible to differentiate between the geographical regions, but the figures can be differentiated in relation to sex, age and education. This confirms what one might presume, namely that the most European Norwegian is a young, university-educated male. Only 38% of those younger than 25 never think of

themselves as European, while for those above 60, the figure is 58% (43% for ages 25-59). Among those whose education is primary school, 56% say they are never Europeans while the corresponding figure for those with a university education is only 30% (41% for secondary school). 40% of the men never think of themselves as Europeans while a majority of the women are absolute non-Europeans (51%).

The same differences, by the way, can be found in the polls concerning Norwegian EC-membership. Pro-EC sentiment is stronger among young, well-educated and males than among older, less educated and females. At the April poll the pro- and anti-group were nuffly the same size: 39% in favour of Norwegian membership and 38% against; 23% had not made up their mind. Among those under 25 years of age, however, as many as 47% were in favour of Norwegian EC-membership, 31% against, and only 22% did not know. All of these figures indicate that by late 1991 and early 1992, the groups that were most receptive to new ideas were also the most pro-European. There *may* thus be a long term trend toward more and more European identity and perhaps also more pro-EC sentiment, but this trend may easily be broken by events in Norway, as well as in the rest of Europe, or "ute i Europa" as Norwegians normally say.

Now, I don't know if you see a contradiction between what I have said earlier in this lecture about the weakness of European identity in Norway, and the barometrical fact that as many as 15% of Norwegians say they often consider themselves European, and 35-40% say they sometimes do. This means there is a clear majority of Norwegians who at least sometimes think of themselves as European. I certainly see a contradiction between what I thought was the case and what the Eurobarometer shows. I must frankly admit that I was surprised when I got the results of the poll. My surprise was certainly not reduced when I compared the Norwegian figures to the figures from the 12 EC countries. In fact, Norway belongs to a group of countries in western, central and southern Europe with a medium level European identity. The countries with a high European identity are the Latin countries, Greece and Luxembourg, e.g. the countries that became EC members most recently, and those closest to the Islamic world.

In the medium group are the Nordic countries Norway and Denmark, and Belgium, the country with the EC capital. It would be interesting to see a breakdown of the figures for the two Belgian ethnics. Is it the French-speaking Belgians that draw the figure upwards?

In the bottom group, then, are the island countries: the United Kingdom and Ireland. This is hardly a surprise: when the British meet Americans and sense the difference in culture and attitude, they probably conceive of the difference as between American and British culture. When Norwegians meet Americans, they notice the same differences, but see them as a difference between Americans and Europeans.

It was more surprising for me to find the Netherlands and Germany in the bottom group. In fact, Germany has the smallest core of often-Europeans of all the 13 countries

included in the poll: less than 10%. How come? Since my task here is to talk about Norway, not Germany, I shall leave that question open, and briefly state my ...

Conclusion

Through the encyclopedial, historical, socio-cultural and text-analytical-political approaches I have established that the concept of being European is traditionally and also currently quite weak in Norway. There is a clear sense of being a peripheral nation with a unique national culture, and a country with a role to play in *the world*. Norway should therefore not be considered as a European country if we demand of such a country that its population attributes a strong and positive meaning to the idea of a European culture. On the other hand -- as the Eurobarometer shows -- Norway is perhaps not as exceptional as Norwegians tend to believe.

It took centuries of European history to supplement local popular identities with the larger French, German and other national identities. It may take longer to supplement the national identities in today's Europe with a larger European identity. But the trend is unmistakable. If we avoid a major catastrophe, it seems likely that the meaning of national identity in a small nation-state like Norway will gradually -- but very gradually -- fade. Norwegians travel and communicate with non-Norwegians far more frequently than before, and more or less everyone speaks the global language: English. This, however, has the double effect of accentuating national identity and supplementing it with cross-national or supra-national identities. Globalized Norwegians will continue to participate courageously in the UN peacekeeping forces (at least as long as they don't have to fight), and in the work of NGOs such as the International Red Cross, but Norwegian Europeanists will need a very great deal of patience. For the time being, the question: "Is Norway a European country?" remains loaded and provocative, and no definite answer can be given. Still there is no need to "take no for an answer". Quite a few Norwegians are Europeans already, and there may be more of them in the future. "Time vil siå", to quote a famous Americanized figure in contemporary Norwegian literature (Solam Gundersen, post-WW2).

There is one thing that has already been shown: Norway is not as exceptional as many Norwegians think. The question "Is Norway a European country" should perhaps be countered with another question which is far more crucial to the future of Europe, and to which the answer, it seems, is no more evident: "Is Germany a European country?"; "Ist Deutschland ein Europäisches Land?"

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