

so many Konoe Fumimarus, with their rejection of "the Anglo-American collusion of interests" in the international status quo, sought their own means of redress for an aggrieved Japan on the international front.

Hence, the stage was set for a Japan in the 1930s with an exclusionary ideal of Pan Asianism, which had never before figured prominently in Japan's national policy. This Pan Asianism manifested itself in several ways. Among others, there was Matsuoka Yosuke's infamous Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere; there was the Pan Asianism of Nakayama Masaru, Prince Konoe's "ghost writer," which amounted to Sino-Japanese cooperation in resisting Western encroachment; and there was Royama Masamichi's conception of a Pan Asianism capable of coexisting with other blocs in the Pacific region. A common thread in all was the belief that Japan, having been aggrieved by the Western-dominated international order, was perfectly justified in speaking for other aggrieved nations, especially in East Asia, and defining their means of redress in terms of Japan's own choosing. The danger that many took lightly—too lightly—was a Japan treading the very path of the transgressors against whom Japan was representing the voices of all aggrieved.

There is a special voice throughout the book. This voice says, sometimes loudly and at other times almost inaudibly, that with or without Japan's Pan Asianism, the aggrieved remained aggrieved throughout East Asia. Miwa wants us to see that somewhere in the ideal and intellectual foundations of Japan's prewar Pan Asianism, with its self-determination of Asian peoples and the notion of regional community for economic cooperation, was the impulse to supersede the "Japaneseness" of Pan Asianism. In reconstructing those foundations, Miwa freely (sometimes too freely) moves among numerous prewar Japanese intellectuals and government officials. Familiar figures such as Nitobe Inazo, Yanaihara Tadao, and Royama Masamichi are everywhere. Not so familiar figures such as Tarui Tokichi are also given important roles. Miwa also runs quickly through a score of research associations these individuals used as their forums. Thus, the book offers a far richer sense of what it is built on than its relatively small size indicates. At the same time, I kept wishing for a bit more substance on some of these individuals, as well as for more powerful, and coherent, statements linking them.

MICHIO UMEGAKI
Washington, D.C.

STEIN TØNNESSON. 1946: *Déclenchement de la guerre d'Indochine; Les vèpres tonkinoises du 19 décembre.*

Translated by BRUNO METZ. (Recherches Asiatiques.) Paris: L'Harmattan, with the cooperation of the Conseil Norvégien de Recherches Scientifiques, Oslo. 1987. Pp. 275.

In the vast outpouring of materials on the Vietnam War, relatively little has recently appeared on the role of the French in instigating the conflict. Scholars still tend to rely on useful but essentially dated accounts, such as Phillipe Devillers's *Histoire du Vietnam, 1940-1952* (1952), and Ellen J. Hammer's *The Struggle for Indochina, 1940-1955* (1954). Fortunately, the French government is now beginning to open its vast archives on the postwar period, thus opening up a rich source of potential new insights on the first years of the war.

This study is one of the first fruits of that process. Stein Tønnesson, a Norwegian historian, has used the French archives to undertake an exhaustive study on the brief interlude of negotiations between the Ho-Sainteny Agreement of March 1946 and the outbreak of the Franco-Vietminh conflict in December.

From the outset, those negotiations were plagued with difficulties, particularly in France, where leftist parties struggled against efforts by conservatives led by High Commissioner Thierry d'Argenlieu to scuttle the March agreement and restore colonial rule in Indochina. During negotiations held at Fontainebleau during the summer of 1946, the Vietnamese president, Ho Chi Minh, attempted to manipulate French political differences to his advantage. Ultimately he failed, and in September, in a desperate effort to prevent the breakdown of the negotiations process, Ho signed a *modus vivendi*, salvaging a cease-fire and postponing new talks until early the following year.

It was the issue of customs that eventually sparked conflict. Colonial officials in Saigon attempted to seize control of Vietnamese customs in the north in order to prevent the Vietnamese from exchanging rice exports for munitions. Their efforts led to the famous incident in which French naval units shelled the native city of Haiphong, killing thousands. Although efforts continued on both sides to head off the conflict, the Haiphong incident set the two nations on the road to war. Convinced that the French were preparing their own assault, the Vietminh launched a preemptive attack on key French installations in the Hanoi area on December 19, 1946.

Ultimately, Tønnesson's account leaves as many questions unanswered as it solves. Why did the Vietminh attack just when the appointment of the French Socialist leader Leon Blum as prime minister suggested the possibility of a peaceful resolution of the crisis? Was Ho Chi Minh's last-minute appeal to Paris deliberately delayed by officials in

Saigon in order to prevent the Vietminh attack? Was the Vietminh attack planned, or, as the fatal moment of incidence that was only resolved among the militia?

Final answers to these questions are still hidden in the minds of surviving Tønnesson has done this taut and provocative form a prelude to our modern times.

R. J. MOORE. *Making*
York: Clarendon
Press. 1987. Pp. xi.

The independence of the subcontinent have and no doubt will cause. They were both high drama and Moore himself has to the literature. *Unity, 1917-1940* *India, 1939-1945* *monwealth*, he focuses that has not always serves. The issue India, Pakistan, but have a special relationship within the Dominions within

The issue arose over the form or tion over specifics from the truism that to favor Hindu alienating one or enough to jeopardize immediately obvious observer, was the a club of white so to "other races" it was as traumatic local cantonment officers had always could accept the tice was something where Dominion tion restrictions. overcome in the common citizen common defenses

Saigon in order to prevent a settlement? Finally, was the Vietminh attack on Hanoi carried out as planned, or, as the author suggests, was there a fatal moment of indecision among party leaders that was only resolved by militant elements (some of them connected with rival nationalist parties) among the militia?

Final answers to the "vespers of Tonkin," then, are still hidden in the French archives and in the minds of surviving party leaders in Hanoi. But Tønnesson has done scholars a distinct service in this taut and provocative account of the events that form a prelude to one of the most tragic periods in modern times.

WILLIAM J. DUIKER
Pennsylvania State University

R. J. MOORE. *Making the New Commonwealth*. New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press, 1987. Pp. xi, 218. \$48.00.

The independence and partition of the Indian subcontinent have fascinated historians since 1947 and no doubt will continue to do so for justifiable cause. They were complex events, possessed of both high drama and long-term significance. R. J. Moore himself has made important contributions to the literature, most notably in *The Crisis of Indian Unity, 1917-1940* (1974) and *Churchill, Cripps, and India, 1939-1945* (1979). In *Making the New Commonwealth*, he focuses more precisely on an aspect that has not always caught the attention it deserves. The issue, put too simply, was whether India, Pakistan, both, or neither would continue to have a special relationship with Britain and the Dominions within the Commonwealth.

The issue arose not merely from the deep anger over the form or costs of partition, from frustration over specifics like Kashmir or Hyderabad, or from the truism that, were Britain to risk choosing to favor Hindu or Muslim, it could be sure of alienating one of them. All of this was trouble enough to jeopardize future relationships. Less immediately obvious, but clear to any reflective observer, was the fact that the Commonwealth was a club of white societies, and the idea of opening it to "other races" in the aftermath of World War II was as traumatic in its way as that of opening the local cantonment club to Indian civilian or military officers had always been. Many across the world could accept the principle, but applying the practice was something quite different, most notably where Dominions had racially exclusive immigration restrictions. That particular obstacle could be overcome in the end by dropping all ideas of common citizenship, along with suggestions of common defense arrangements. It was less easy to

find a satisfactory rationalization for Burma's quick and final pronouncement that it was uninterested in any such special relationship. Since Eire, too, was moving away from Commonwealth status, the portents were ominous.

All of this Moore explains well in this short but fully annotated and well-written study. Treated in less detail, inevitably, are the two other contexts in which decisions to reshape the Commonwealth were made. The first was that of the Middle East, where Britain was struggling to preserve Arab friendship in the midst of an insoluble dilemma in Palestine. Pakistan was Muslim and, to some, a necessary bulwark of Middle Eastern stability. Indian leaders, fully aware of Britain's concern, were inclined to see decisions favoring Pakistan as just that, favors given for services rendered and not awards made on the merits of the case.

The other context was that of the cold war, and it led to the gravest of inter-British disputes. Ernest Bevin, under the urging of his Foreign Office advisers, argued that India within the Commonwealth would simply pressure other members to pursue India's policies and larger vision of the future of the Asian world. Alternatively India would leave the group, and either eventuality would weaken the institution, perhaps irretrievably. Not without major struggle was Bevin converted to the larger view that India outside the Commonwealth—aside from forcing the group to back Pakistan in every quarrel—would be far more susceptible to Communist influence, jeopardizing Britain's entire position in Southeast Asia and the Far East. Once past this debate, one final issue, format, remained. India was a republic, not a monarchy, and was unwilling to give homage to the king as king. It was left to Sir Girja Bajpai, a "patrician Anglophile" (p. 201), to find a formula with the simplicity of genius: the king would be the symbol of free association only, "Head of the Commonwealth," not its ruler.

To these, and other issues, Moore brings economy of style, enviable expertise in the sources, and years of reflection. The result is an admirable book. It would be easy to ask that this or that theme (particularly concerning extra-India influences) be developed more fully, but such additions would demand a different, and still more expensive, book. The plan Moore has adopted works well. This volume belongs on the shelf of anyone seriously interested in twentieth-century India and in the significant stages of the evolution of the Commonwealth as a whole.

BRITON C. BUSCH
Colgate University